- Published on 12 June 2020
Submissions are invited for a Topical Issue of EPJ B on Evolutionary Game Theory.
Statistical physics has proven to be valuable for better understanding counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes. By treating evolutionary games akin to classical spin models, a physicist can draw on experience and knowledge from familiar models in classical physics. However, unlike pairwise interactions among particles that typically govern solid-state systems, interactions among living organisms often involve groups, and they also involve a larger number of possible states even for the most simplified description of reality. The complexity of solutions observed in evolutionary games therefore often surpasses that observed in classical physical systems.
Indeed, methods of statistical physics have come a long way in improving our understanding of the emergence of cooperation, and they have revealed different types of phase transitions leading to it. Research has revealed that these depend sensitively on the structure of the interaction network and the type of interactions, as well as on the number and type of competing strategies. More recently, these methods have also been used to explore the evolution of "moral behaviors" other than cooperation, such as honesty and altruistic punishment.
The Monte Carlo method is typically used for simulations, enabling a comparison of obtained results with generalized mean-field approximations and a proper determination of phase transitions between different stable strategy configurations. The goal is to identify and understand pattern formation, the spatiotemporal dynamics of solutions, and the principles of self-organization that lead to observed evolutionary outcomes.
This Topical Issue on Evolutionary Game Theory seeks to publish original research as well as short reviews that advance this field, particularly at the interface with statistical physics and network science. Topics of interests include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
- Moral behavior
- Social dilemmas
- Public goods game
- Sender-Receiver game
- Donation game
- Trust game
- Coordination games
- Strategic complexity
- Behavioral economics and experiments
The issue is open to everyone working in the field. We invite contributors to communicate their intention to submit manuscripts for this Topical Issue to the Guest Editors as soon as possible. Please provide the tentative title of the paper and a short abstract. The full manuscripts should be submitted before the deadline directly to the EPJB Editorial Office at https://articlestatus.edpsciences.org/is/epjb.
Deadline for submission: December 31, 2021
Submissions should be clearly identified as intended for the Topical Issue " Evolutionary Game Theory". Papers will be published continuously and will appear (as soon as accepted) on the journal website. The electronic version of the Topical Issue will contain all accepted papers in the order of publication. All submitted papers will be refereed according to the usual high standards of the journal. More general information about EPJB including instructions for authors is available at http://epjb.epj.org/.
EPJ is a hybrid journal offering Open Access publication via the Open Choice programme. We have a growing number of Springer Compact “Publish and Read” arrangements – see here – which enable authors to publish OA at no direct cost (all costs are paid centrally). As of April 2020 this list includes Austria, the Netherlands, Qatar, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, the UK, Switzerland and Germany.